Chapter 9: Gauging Political Tolerance through a List Experiment: Findings from a Survey of American Muslims

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Introduction

Political theorists have long viewed intolerance as deleterious to democracy. From John Locke’s call to abandon the imposition of religious conformity to J.S. Mill’s advocacy for a “marketplace of ideas,” the liberal foundations of tolerance in the public sphere are well established. Yet, despite being a cornerstone of liberal democracy, political tolerance remains a particularly difficult norm to inculcate. It is perhaps due to the gulf between its significance and its incidence that, for over sixty years, scholars have plumbed the determinants of this fundamental norm.

Despite the breadth of literature on this topic, however, some blind spots remain. For example, the dozens of studies stemming from Stouffer’s (1955) seminal work on political tolerance have thus far largely neglected the influence of minority status—and the particular experiences and worldviews that accompany it—in augmenting tolerance judgments. There are important differences between majority and minority citizens across various domains of public opinion (Kinder and Winter 2001; Kinder and Kam 2009; Peffley and Hurwitz 2010), and there is no reason to think that intolerance should constitute an exception to this tendency. Yet, analyses of political intolerance almost exclusively draw on data from representative samples of the population at large (most often the General Social Survey), or otherwise random samples meant to approximate majoritarian attributes (e.g., religious affiliation (Eisenstein 2006)).

Additionally, within discrete categories of determinants, certain variables have not received their due attention. This is the case with studies gauging the ways in which religion influences tolerance judgments. Although scholars have evaluated the role of religious commitment, doctrinal belief, and practice, they have altogether overlooked the particularly relevant matter of views on salvation. That is, they have yet to consider whether theological
intolerance maps to *political* intolerance. Although this link is more readily associated with, for instance, Early Modern Europe—an age when theological and literal battle lines were virtually one and the same—it may still be relevant today given the global resurgence of religion (Berger 1999). Indeed, despite the institutional decoupling of faith and politics, the perception that an uncompromising religious outlook negatively affects social order continues to hold sway (Huntington 1993).

In this chapter, I address both these deficiencies in part by employing a survey instrument novel to the study of political tolerance: the list experiment. Recruiting a sample of respondents from a low-incidence population poses myriad challenges (Berry, Chouhoud, and Junn 2016). Given the added effort it takes to populate these samples, extra care should be taken to ensure the resultant data’s validity. To this end, when social desirability may be a concern, shielded response techniques provide a means to guard against this potential source of bias by broaching sensitive topics in an unobtrusive way. Moreover, in the case of political tolerance, a list experiment can be especially fruitful as it also always for an atypical multivariate analysis of the data.

The subject of the current study is an especially salient minority: American Muslims. The opinions of this group hold particular utility for tolerance research given that liberalism not only institutionalizes the political rights of minorities, but also assumes that these minorities reciprocally respect the rights of other groups in society. This latter expectation highlights a more pragmatic reason to examine this population. Namely, with anti-Muslim sentiment in the United States relatively high and periodically spiking in accordance with intermittent
controversies (e.g., the so-called “ground-zero mosque”),1 investigating the attitudes of American Muslims themselves could shed light on the factors influencing negative appraisals of this community. Indeed, animosity and intolerance toward this religious minority (which previous chapters in this volume have elaborated on) may be motivated in part by a belief that Muslims in America are particularly dogmatic and wish to impose their worldview rather than allow all perspectives to be heard. The movement to ban any recourse to sharia in several state legislatures across the country, for example, speaks to the perception that Islam promotes a legal and political system that seeks to supersede existing US laws and government (Cesari 2013).

Analyzing original survey data coupled with an embedded list experiment, two key findings emerge: 1) American Muslim political intolerance is not discernibly triggered by generally disagreeable ideas (that is, those that are anti-religion), but is focused, instead, on groups specifically espousing intolerance towards Muslims and Islam; and 2) theological intolerance, operationalized as exclusivist views toward salvation, exerts a significant and negative effect on political tolerance levels, but this disposition does not render one immune from the positive effects of education and acculturation. In practical terms, these findings undermine the contention that American Muslims are invariably intolerant and highlight the need for more empirically grounded examinations of this community’s beliefs and actions.

Methodologically, this study outlines a means to leverage the added internal validity of list experiments while sacrificing relatively little in terms of data richness. Additionally, the results

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1 One meta-analysis of polling data in America since 9/11 demonstrates that in the years following the terrorist attacks, highly unfavorable attitudes towards Muslims began to slightly subside only to climb once more beginning in 2010, around the time of the Park51 controversy, eventually reaching levels at or above those of late 2001 (Kurzman 2014).
point to salvific exclusivity constituting a meaningful standalone measure of religiosity, though more research is needed to determine the breadth of its useful application to tolerance studies.

**Political Tolerance—Development and Determinants**

The modern study of political tolerance arguably began with the seminal work of Samuel Stouffer (1955), who aimed to empirically examine whether liberal norms actually held sway within the American public. More specifically, conducting his research in the midst of the McCarthy-led Red Scare, Stouffer sought to gauge whether Americans’ attitudes were in line with the country’s widespread political repression. The overall sentiment in his analysis was unequivocal: Americans were more than willing to limit the rights and freedoms of groups (not just communists, but also socialists and atheists) whose beliefs challenged their own.

Stouffer’s work spawned a vast body of research outlining the determinants of political tolerance (commonly conceptualized as the degree to which one is willing to “put up with” groups they highly dislike (Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1982)). Scholars have, *inter alia,* examined whether elites are systematically more tolerant than the mass public (Jackman 1972, McClosky and Brill 1983), alternatively confirmed or refuted Stouffer’s prediction that tolerance levels in America would increase over time (Davis 1975, Nunn, Crockett and Williams 1978; Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus 1979, Mondak and Sanders 2003), and delineated a range of individual and contextual determinants of intolerance. Among this latter set of studies, those elaborating the role of minority status and religiosity inform much of the following analysis.

**Minority Status**

Little attention has been paid to the role minority status may play as a determinant of political tolerance. One notable exception is Davis (1995), who conducted the only systematic analysis of the nature of intolerance among African Americans. His findings call into question
the perception that, due to cultural and socio-economic disparities, blacks in America are pre-
disposed to authoritarian beliefs (Dahl 1956; Lipset 1960). Specifically, Davis concludes that
black intolerance is heightened when it comes to the Ku Klux Klan while registering no
discernable difference from typical levels of intolerance exhibited by non-blacks toward
“everyday racists” (1995, 12). This suggests that, at least among one racial minority in the U.S.,
intolerance is not a blanket and involuntary reaction stemming from cultural proclivities, but a
conscious decision to secure the group from hatred and violence.

Other tolerance studies that comparably focus on minority groups in America are rare.
Most of these works were largely occasioned by specific episodes. For example, Gibson and
Bingham (1984) examine American Jews’ tolerance in light of an infamous legal dispute
involving neo-Nazis in Skokie, Illinois. Likewise, Gibson (1987) analyzes the lead up to a Ku
Klux Klan rally in Houston, Texas to gauge homosexuals’ political tolerance. Similarly, although
they do not intensely examine a single incident, Djupe and Calfano (2012, 516) nonetheless open
their study of American Muslims by sketching a dispute in which the Miami Dade
Transportation Authority removed ads deemed “offensive to Islam” from their buses. Given its
clear substantive relevance, this latter study deserves further consideration.

To my knowledge, Djupe and Calfano (2012) have to date conducted the only academic
study of tolerance—and one of the relatively few on public opinion, more generally—focused on
American Muslims. As such, their findings naturally carry a lot weight. This makes it all the
more notable—and normatively troubling—that their study tells a mostly negative tale. More
specifically, after prompting their sample of American Muslims to consider the views of
someone who (in the abstract) is against Christianity and Islam, respectively, Djupe and Calfano
report a marked dearth of tolerant responses. Only about 30% of respondents chose the civil
libertarian option in any of the three anti-Christian scenarios while even fewer were tolerant of
the same actions when directed against Islam: 20% would acquiesce an anti-Muslim speech in
their community, 9% would allow a person against Islam to teach at a university, and 6% would
permit a book critical of Muslims in their local public library. What is more, the authors find that
both “mosque attendance” and “Koran literalism” predict greater intolerance. These latter results
point to a second set of relevant determinants.

Religiosity

From the earliest studies and for decades thereafter, scholars have consistently found a
link between religious conviction and intolerance. Stouffer’s (1955) original results initially
suggested that regular churchgoers were generally less tolerant that those who infrequently
attended services or did not attend at all. Subsequent research added more nuance to this
relationship by examining additional dimensions of religious life, yet the underlying notion of
“more religious” mapping to “more intolerant” remained overwhelmingly stable (Nunn,
Crockett, and Williams 1978; Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1982; McClosky and Brill-Scheuer
1983).

Despite these steady results, not all scholars are convinced of the resolutely negative link
between religion and tolerance. Busch (1998) contends that prior findings, given their reliance on
a fixed-group tolerance battery (carried over from Stouffer (1955)) and blunt gauges of
religiosity, are mainly measurement artifacts rather than genuine representations of underlying
attitudes. Eisenstein (2006) similarly opts for content-controlled (or “least-liked”) political
tolerance measures (Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1982) and couples her analysis with better

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2 See the “Data and Methods” section below for elaboration on the difference between the fixed-
group and content-controlled measures of political tolerance.
specified religion variables. She concludes, after additionally applying oft-neglected psychological variables into her sequential equation model, that neither “doctrinal orthodoxy” nor “religious commitment” has a direct effect on political tolerance. Using still other methods (i.e., propensity score matching) to disentangle the effect of the “three B’s”—behavior, belief, and belonging—Burge (2013) finds that biblical literalism decreases political tolerance, while church attendance often increases tolerance. Thus, while the preponderance of evidence still suggests that religiosity (variably defined) exerting a negative effect on tolerance (Gibson 2010), this link is not as airtight nor as comprehensive as once believed.

**Hypotheses**

In light of the extant literature reviewed above and the current political and social atmosphere in America, two hypotheses guide my analysis. The first examines whether American Muslim political intolerance is narrowly or broadly distributed. On the one hand, majoritarian accounts of political intolerance in America find it to be generally high, but pluralistic in nature, rather than singling out a particular group (Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1982; Gibson 2007). On the other hand, Davis (1995) finds that African-American intolerance is acutely directed toward the Ku Klux Klan and theorizes that this is a conscious decision motivated by the particular threat that the group poses. This concentration of African-American intolerance is put in stark relief when compared to the comparatively much more tolerant responses toward other disliked groups, including unspecified racists.

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3 Notably, however, Eisenstein (2006) does find an indirect effect for these two variables. Specifically, doctrinal orthodoxy increased threat perception, which in turn decreased tolerance, whereas religious commitment negatively influenced secure personality, the latter being a positive predictor of tolerance.
I contend that American Muslim intolerance is similarly focused on Islamophobic groups (that is, those groups that are specifically anti-Muslim in their actions and speech) rather than on groups broadly against religion. This claim is generally in accordance with Davis’ (1995) theory while somewhat diverging from Djupe and Calfano’s (2012) findings. The hypothesis, however, is not meant to equate the legacies of the Ku Klux Klan and Islamophobia—clearly the former has had a much more devastating and lasting impact on its target group. Yet, at the same time, one should not discount the very real threats that Muslims face on account of their faith. Indeed, in keeping with the rising trend in anti-Muslim sentiment (Kurzman 2014), hate crimes targeting Muslims have spiked in recent years to near record highs (Spross 2014). Islamophobic groups, therefore, should elicit a more intense perception of threat from American Muslims than anti-religionists (that is, those groups broadly against religion).

\[ H_1: \text{American Muslim intolerance is significantly higher toward Islamophobic groups compared to Anti-Religionists.} \]

While the first hypothesis highlighted considerations particular to American Muslims, the second hypothesis outlines an association with a potentially more general application. Specifically, although religiosity has featured prominently in numerous tolerance studies, scholars have yet to examine whether theological intolerance, conceived of as exclusivist views on salvation, heightens political intolerance. Speaking to this potential link, Rousseau (1762 | 1987) asserts: “It is impossible to live in peace with those one believes to be damned...Whenever theological intolerance is allowed, it is impossible for it not to have some civil effect.” Though not as absolute in his conviction, John Rawls, generally a champion of religious freedom, nonetheless anticipates that exclusivist visions of salvation will decline in popularity as individuals holding various comprehensive doctrines strive towards an overlapping consensus:
“[I]t is difficult, if not impossible, to believe in the damnation of those with whom we have, with trust and confidence, long and fruitfully cooperated in maintaining a just society” (cited in Fadel 2013). Taken together, these two quotes establish the expectation that (1) theological intolerance correlates with political intolerance, and (2) those who hold an exclusivist view of salvation are resistant to the forces that typically augment tolerance (namely, education and socialization).

$H_{2a}$: Salvific exclusivity is associated with higher political intolerance.

$H_{2b}$: Education level and nativity do not attenuate the negative effect of theological intolerance on political intolerance.

**Data and Methods**

To test the preceding hypotheses, I leverage original survey data from a sample of American Muslims recruited online from April 26, 2014 to May 30, 2014. The link to this online survey was distributed through representatives of major American Muslim organizations and websites across America through email and social media across the political and ideological spectrum. Additional solicitation of participants occurred through the enlistment of diverse religious and community leaders to advertise the survey to their respective networks. As an incentive, each participant was given an opportunity to enter their email in a drawing for one of twenty Amazon.com gift cards valued at $10 each.

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4 These include, *inter alia*, the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC), the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), Muslim for Progressive Values (MPV) and MuslimMatters.org.

5 These include, *inter alia*, Suhaib Webb, a popular imam based out of Boston at the time of the survey; Wajahat Ali, a journalist and (again, at the time) television host with Al Jazeera America; Mona Eltahawy, a well-known feminist activist and journalist; and Rabia Chaudry, a civic leader, lawyer, and columnist.

6 The online form for the drawing was separate from the main survey and multiple assurances were given to the participants that their email addresses were in no way linked to their responses.
A total of 465 eligible respondents were ultimately obtained through this process. This chain-referral recruitment technique mirrored the objective of respondent-driven sampling (RDS), though admittedly lacked the latter’s statistical inference as the link through which participants reached the survey was not tracked. Nonetheless, the final sample’s demographic breakdown compares favorably to a nationally representative sample of American Muslims (Pew Research Center 2011) on certain dimensions, particularly those associated with religiosity, while diverging on others (see Appendix for a comparison).

To gauge political tolerance, I employ a survey instrument novel to this domain of public opinion research: a list experiment. Given the difficulties of sampling American Muslims, this shielded response technique helps ensure that the effort is worthwhile by improving the study’s internal validity. Before elaborating this method, it is worth reviewing the predominant political tolerance measures in the discipline.

To date, scholars have relied on two primary means of measuring political tolerance. With the “fixed-group” method, each respondent in a survey is asked a battery of questions about the civil liberties they would be willing to extend to each of several groups (usually no more than five) from a static set. With the “content-controlled” method, respondents are first asked to identify their “least-liked” group from a list (or write in their own choice if the list does not

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7 This final tally corresponds to the total number of individuals who completed the survey and met the two fundamental criteria of being an American citizen and self-identifying as a Muslim.

8 More specifically, the goal of RDS is to attenuate the bias in an initial convenience sample by reaching a sufficiently broad cross-section of the target population in successive sampling waves (Heckathorn 1997).

9 Scholars will often also ask respondents to apply the political tolerance battery to their second or even third least-liked group for additional layers of comparison (e.g., Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1982; Gibson 2013).
include their relevant group) and are subsequently asked roughly the same battery of questions as in the fixed-group method.

Combining aspects of both these measurement techniques, the list experiment incorporated into this study’s survey gauges American Muslim intolerance toward anti-religionists, on the one hand, and Islamophobic / anti-Muslim groups, on the other. The logic behind list experiments is fairly straightforward. First, a subset of the sample is randomly assigned into a baseline condition, presented with a list of items specific to that condition, then and asked how many of those items they would choose in response to a particular prompt. In this case, the items are groups that elicit various levels of antipathy and the corresponding prompts gauge a respondents’ willingness to extend these groups’ civil liberties as well as the degree of threat they perceive from these groups.

Second, a treatment condition presents the same question (or set of questions) along with the same choice of items as the baseline group, but with the addition of the researcher’s item of interest (in this case, the group for which we want to measure political tolerance and threat perception towards). Subsequently, a difference-in-means test between the baseline and treatment conditions provides an unbiased estimate of the percentage of the sample population that would truthfully choose that item of interest if presented as a direct question. For example, if the question asked how many of the listed groups a respondent would oppose giving a speech in their neighborhood and the mean number of groups chosen in the baseline condition was 2.10, comparing that result with the mean of the treatment condition, say, 2.55, allows us to estimate that 45% of the sample population would be unwilling to allow members of the group added as an extra item in the treatment condition to give a public speech.
List experiments are generally employed to ascertain revealed preferences when stated preferences can potentially be swayed by a social desirability norm, such as in the case of ascertaining racist attitudes, or when the survey design may be affecting the responses. In the first instance, American Muslims may be hesitant to express their willingness to limit another’s civil liberties in light of, on the one hand, the atmosphere of suspicion toward their own democratic *bona fides*, and, on the other hand, the suspicion that they themselves may have toward anyone collecting data on their community. The large number of survey participants who, despite the study’s unobtrusive research design, nonetheless chose the “prefer not to answer” response option speaks to this concern.\(^\text{10}\)

Survey effects may similarly come into play when surveying this population. Despite sound sampling strategy and standard question wording, for example, Djupe and Calfano (2012) nonetheless record a rather high percentage of Muslims willing to remove an anti-Islam book from their public library (96%). Typically, this prompt elicits close to the least amount of intolerance among respondents (see, e.g., Djupe, Lewis, and Jelen 2016). Thus, in addition to blunting the effect of asking sensitive questions, employing a list experiment also guards against potentially skewed results from non-obvious survey effects.

After an initial screening to determine if participants met the minimum requirements to take the survey (see note 8), respondents were randomized into one of four groups corresponding to a single baseline condition and three treatment conditions. Each group was presented with a list and asked to indicate how many of the groups on that list (*not which specific ones*) they would support limiting their civil liberties in the manner described. Three of the four questions

\(^{10}\) Notably, over 50 of the 465 eligible respondents in the final sample opted for that response on one of the four questions used to construct the political tolerance scale utilized in the multivariate regression on the pooled data below, and thus were excluded from that analysis.
mirrored those in Djupe and Calfano’s (2012) study (asking whether respondents would support a ban on members of the group teaching in a college, a ban on them giving a speech in their neighborhood, or the removal from the local public library of a book written by one of their members) with an additional query asking how many of the groups a respondent would support banning from running for public office. A question gauging Sociotropic Threat rounds out the list experiment portion of the questionnaire, wherein respondents are asked to indicate how many of the groups they believe are a threat to their way of life. Threat perception is one of the most consistent predictors of political intolerance (e.g., Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1982; Marcus et al. 1995; Gibson and Gouws 2003; Davis and Silver 2004; Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior 2004) and is a staple measure in any tailored tolerance study (i.e., one that does not rely exclusively on existing survey data).

This five-question list experiment was presented to each of the four randomized conditions with the variation being in the enumerated items respondents could choose from. In the Baseline condition, the list included only the four control items: Nazis, The Ku Klux Klan, Christian Fundamentalists, and Homosexual Rights Activists. The AR-Treatment condition included each of the four items from the Baseline group, with the addition of “Anti-Religionists.” The AM-Treatment condition included the four control items, plus “Islamophobic / Anti-Muslim Groups.” Finally, the Dual-Treatment condition, which serves largely as a robustness check, included the four control items with the addition of both “Anti-Religionists” and “Islamophobic / Anti-Muslim Groups.” Figure 1 details each of the questions in the tolerance battery while Figure 2 provides an example of the survey prompt corresponding to the list experiment portion (in this case, gauging sociotropic threat, or threats to one’s way of life), with treatment-specific options in brackets.
Alongside the experimental component, the survey included several direct measures of key demographic and religion variables. In addition to Age, sex (Female), Race/Ethnicity, and Education, the questionnaire also asked whether respondents were either born in the United States or immigrated prior to their primary education (coded as Born in America). The theoretical rational for this variable’s inclusion is that one would expect democratic norms, among them political tolerance, to be more ingrained in those individuals whose upbringing in America began from an early age.

The questionnaire’s religiosity battery gauged Mosque Attendance, Influence of Islam on the respondent’s life, and Frequency of Prayer, drawing on the standard dimensions of behavior, belief, and belonging (with adjustments made to fit the phrasing within an Islamic frame). A measurement of belief in Quran Literalism similarly accords with the usual factors tested in tolerance studies, but goes beyond the typical dichotomous rendering. Specifically, the question offers the respondent a choice to maintain the text is the literal word of God while acknowledging that some of the content is metaphoric, in addition to the standard options of, on the one hand, the text being literal in origin and interpretation and, on the other hand, the text is a book of history written by men.

The survey also includes a novel measure of religiosity, Salvific Exclusivity, which assesses the degree to which a respondent holds exclusionary views of the Afterlife. Drawing on

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11 So as not to assume away bias through the possible priming of religious identity, the survey randomly assigned respondents to receive the religiosity battery either before or after the experimental component gauging political tolerance. Subsequent analysis demonstrated that the question order exerted no discernable influence on the responses.
Khalil’s (2012) tripartite typology of exclusivist, inclusivist, and pluralist interpretations of the Hereafter in classical Islamic thought, four options (in addition to “prefer not to answer”) were presented to respondents: (1) Islam is the only religion that leads to Heaven; (2) Islam is the only religion that leads to Heaven, yet non-Muslims may be eligible for salvation if they did not receive the message of Islam or received only a distorted version; (3) Believers of any Abrahamic faith are equally eligible to enter Heaven, but not those who practice other faiths or disbelieve in God; and (4) All are equally eligible for salvation, regardless of belief. The resulting data thus allows the first empirical mapping of theological intolerance to political intolerance. Naturally, this particular operationalization is constructed with the target sample in mind, however a more general version can be fashioned for broader application.

Results and Discussion

Analysis of the data supports the hypothesis that American Muslims distinguish between the targeted hatred of Islamophobic groups and the general disagreeableness of anti-religionists. Comparing pooled political intolerance counts (i.e., the total number of groups that a respondent chose for each of the four scenarios presented to them) in Table 1 evidences that anti-religionists do not trigger a statistically distinguishable level of political intolerance from the control group while the Islamophobic treatment is statistically significant and meaningfully different in magnitude compared to both the control group and the AR-Treatment condition. Although no population percentage estimates can be derived from these aggregated results, the comparison is nonetheless indicative of the general finding throughout the remaining analyses.

The disaggregated data in Table 2 highlights the domains in which intolerance manifests most acutely. The most glaring finding is that none of the prompts within the AR-Treatment
elicited a statistically distinguishable response from the *Baseline Treatment*. These results lend tentative support to my hypothesis that those against religion, generally, do not trigger inordinately high intolerant attitudes among American Muslims. Specifically, in the cumulative General Social Survey (GSS) data from 1972-2006, the questions gauging tolerance toward anti-religionists yield comparable or even higher totals: Speech—29%; Teach—49%; Book—33%.

The results for the *AM-Treatment* tell an entirely different story. The only prompt that fails to yield statistical significance is the one asking respondents about the removal of a book from the public library. With regards to the other tolerance measures, 63% of the population sample willing to support banning Islamophobic groups from giving a speech in their neighborhood with 78% willing to ban them from teaching at their local college. These high figures could be due to the belief that limiting the civil liberties of anti-Muslims groups would provide added security from targeted hatred, in general, and protect children from the ramifications of that hatred, in particular. The prompt on banning groups from running for office, however, obtains neither the same magnitude nor the same level of statistical significance as either the speech or teaching scenarios. On its face, this result seems somewhat counterintuitive; however, prior research has shown that the degree to which one believes the target group can actually wield power in the political system does not condition tolerance judgments (e.g., Gibson and Gouws 2003).

Turning to the analysis of threat perception, Table 3 shows that 59 percent of the population sample finds Islamophobic groups threatening to their way of life compared to 29

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12 This supporting evidence is tempered by the less-than-ideal sample sizes, which lead to the strictly speaking uninterruptable results in the Teach and Book prompts.
percent who feel this way about anti-religionists. This latter finding speaks to the general validity of this approach in that it allows for greater confidence that what is being measured throughout this experiment is the actual treatment effect rather than the intent to treat.

[Table 3 about here]

Multivariate regression analysis of the pooled data highlights additional noteworthy results. Such an analysis is uncommon for list experiments, which often focus exclusively on point estimates for the item of interest rather than a general disposition common to all the list items, given that this underlying attitude is often meaningless. For example, in studies measuring latent racism, the shared strand between the item testing this attitude and the control items is, trivially, things that the respondent does not care for. In the present study, however, the control items along with the items of interest collectively tap political intolerance, thereby providing the basis for a scaled variable.

For ease of interpretation, the key variables of interest—political tolerance and sociotropic threat—are all rescaled from 0-1 as a function of the total count for each respondent given the total possible count available for their treatment condition.13 Figure 3 further subsets the data on tolerance into quartiles, demonstrating a fairly stable distribution from the lowest to highest levels of intolerance. Prior to analysis, the sample was weighted (using iterated proportional fitting, also known as “raking”) to the Pew Research Center (2011) percentages for age, gender, and education. The resulting weights ranged from .19 to 5.08.

[Figure 3 about here]

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13 Poisson regressions were run with the raw count data for these two scales with identical results in terms of statistical significance.
Figure 4 models political intolerance as a function of threat, demographics and religiosity. In line with prior research, the effect of Sociotropic Threat is statistically and substantively the most significant predictor of intolerant judgments. Those Born in America are more tolerant than foreign born American Muslims, which, coupled with the effect of Education, suggests that respondents with more exposure to America’s civil libertarian norms tend to exhibit those ideals attitudinally. Somewhat surprisingly, none of the religiosity variables exert a discernible impact on a respondent’s level of political tolerance, save for Salvific Exclusivity: Those with exclusivist views on salvation are more intolerant than those subscribing to pluralistic interpretations of the Afterlife.

[Figure 4 about here]

Given that exclusivist views on salvation seem to push respondents toward higher levels of intolerance, are those who hold such beliefs less susceptible to the factors that typically pull individuals towards more tolerant attitudes? It does not appear so. Figure 5 plots the predicted probability that respondents would be in the "Most Intolerant" quartile as a function of holding either pluralist or exclusivist beliefs in salvation. Although pluralists start at a little over 20% likelihood and exclusivists at a little over 50%, these probabilities diminish for each group with each added level of education. Similarly, as Figure 6 shows, those respondents born in the United States have a lower likelihood than their foreign-born counterparts (all else equal) to provide highly intolerant judgments. Indeed, this result is likely conservative as the survey included only American citizens and not more recent immigrants. Thus, the negative effect of holding salvifically exclusive views does not seem to be uniquely intractable. This finding further undermines the contention that American Muslims are, on account of their faith, particularly dogmatic or anti-democratic.
Conclusion

This study sought to expand the paucity of empirical literature on minority political tolerance. The experimental data support the hypothesis that American Muslims intolerance is targeted rather than invariable; groups that are explicitly anti-Muslim elicit intolerance to a significantly higher degree than unspecified anti-religionists. Multivariate analysis of the observational data further elaborates the role of key determinants in this dynamic. In particular, I demonstrate the utility of theological intolerance as a meaningful predictor of political intolerance, while also highlighting that the negative effect of exclusivist belief in salvation is far from insurmountable. These findings thus suggest that future studies examining the influence of religiosity on tolerance should incorporate salvific exclusivity in their empirical models.

On a more practical level, the preceding analysis undermines Islamophobic contentions that Muslims in America are broadly and deeply intolerant, and thus not adopting (or adapting to) liberal democratic norms. More generally, this study underscores the need for further research on the attitudes and behaviors of minority groups in America. In the absence of such systematic examinations, it is clear that isolated anecdotes and unfounded accusations will continue to cloud our understanding of these increasingly vulnerable populations.
## Appendix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demographic &amp; Religious Measures</th>
<th>Pew 2011 (%)</th>
<th>Current Study (%)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in the United States</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>79*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>84</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-white</td>
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<td>60</td>
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<td>College Graduate</td>
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<td>40</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age 18-29</td>
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<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 40-54</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offers Five Daily Prayers</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attends Mosque At Least Weekly</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The survey question for this variable asked not only whether you were born in the United States, but also whether you immigrated to America prior to age 5. Thus, this figure is likely inflated. Moreover, the survey excluded those who were not American citizens. This criterion, given that 30% of foreign-born Muslims in America are not naturalized citizens (Pew 2011), also likely skewed the tally in the current study.
References


Peffley, Mark, and Jon Hurwitz. 2010. Justice in America: The Separate Realities of Blacks and


Figures and Tables

Figure 1: Political Tolerance Battery

- How many of the above groups would you support banning their members from teaching at your local college?
- How many of the above groups would you support banning their members from giving a public speech in your community?
- How many of the above groups would you support removing a book written by one of their members from your local public library?
- How many of the above groups would you support banning their members from running for office in your local district?

Figure 2: Example of List Experiment Question

Figure 3: Distribution of Political Intolerance
Figure 4: Determinants of American Muslim Political Intolerance (Weighted)

NOTE: Race/Ethnicity and treatment assignment are included in the analysis, but excluded from the model.
Figure 5: Marginal Effects of Salvific Exclusivity (by Education)

Figure 6: Marginal Effects of Salvific Exclusivity (by Nativity)
### Table 1: Political Intolerance Score (Difference in means vs. Baseline)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AR-Treatment</th>
<th>AM-Treatment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.30 (max=20)</td>
<td>8.88 (max=20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(n=99)</td>
<td>(n=102)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>6.98 (max=16)</td>
<td>1.90**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n=95)</td>
<td>(0.77)</td>
<td>(0.74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AR-Treatment</td>
<td>7.30 (max=20)</td>
<td>1.58*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n=99)</td>
<td>(0.77)</td>
<td>(0.85)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

### Table 2: Percent Intolerant (Difference in Means vs. Baseline)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Toward Anti-Religionists</th>
<th>Toward Islamophobes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Give Speech</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>63%**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teach at Local College</td>
<td>-5%</td>
<td>78%***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Run for Office</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>33%†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Book in Library</td>
<td>-6%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses

† $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

# The baseline and both treatment groups each had ~100 observations
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Toward Anti-Religionists</th>
<th>Toward Islamophobes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sociotropic Threat</td>
<td>29%†</td>
<td>59%***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses
† p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
# The baseline and both treatment groups each had ~100 observations